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Introduction: This study deals with examining factors that catalyze demand for community-
based micro health insurance (MHI) schemes. We hypothesize that demand for health insurance 
is a collective decision in the context of informality and poverty. Our hypothesis challenges the 
classical theory of demand which posits individual expected diminishing utility. We examine 
factors beyond the traditional exogenous variables.
Methods: This study uses data collected through a household survey conducted among self-help 
groups in rural India in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar before the implementation of three 
community-based MHI schemes. Additional information was extracted from the management 
information system maintained by the schemes. At the first step, we compared the estimated 
probability of a household joining the scheme (obtained by applying logistic regression) to the 
actual uptake. In the next step, we analyzed the role of consensus within groups on demand for 
health insurance (by applying ordinary least square regressions).
Results: The results of the logistic regressions indicated that exogenous household characteristics 
could not explain the probability of joining health insurance. We observed that group consen-
sus on several critical issues, such as the price of the insurance, perceptions about exposure to 
adverse health events, and perceptions of the quality of service of local health care providers, 
was the important determinant of demand for insurance.
Conclusion: Based on the analysis, we reject the null hypothesis that demand is an individual 
decision at the household level. The analysis upholds the assumption that demand is created 
through a process of consensus building on perceptions of risk exposure, welfare gains from the 
insurance, and quality of local health care provision. Success in catalyzing demand for health 
insurance in the informal sector depends on encouraging group dialog.
Keywords: Community-based Health Insurance, micro insurance, consensus coefficient, con-
sensus building, demand for micro insurance, collective decision
Introduction
The United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO) promote the uni-
versalization of health insurance coverage to provide financial protection from health 
shocks (a policy called Universal Health Coverage [UHC]).1 However, in many low- and 
middle-income countries (LMIC), the efforts of government to implement UHC are 
unsuccessful because much of the population is in the “informal sector”, ie, outside the 
reach of most governmental social programs and ill-informed about the advantages of 
being included.2 India is a case in point: notwithstanding health insurance schemes in 
some 30 states (also known as social health insurance [SHI] schemes) in 2017,3 uptake 
was limited in 2015–2016 to ~29% of the population.4 Uninsured households had to pay 
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a large share of health care costs out of pocket.5 Moreover, as 
loans often fund out of pocket spending (OOPS), the welfare 
losses extended beyond the cost of care to include the cost of 
interest (called “hardship financing”).6 Estimates from India 
of the outright impoverishment due to these cumulative costs 
vary from 2.2%7 to 3.3%8 and to 3.5% of the total popula-
tion annually.9 Even in the face of these severe consequences 
and the fact that there are no effective alternatives to health 
insurance (HI) to deal with OOPS in the informal and rural 
sector,10,11 most people do not join on a voluntary basis. This 
situation begs an answer to the question: “If the benefits of HI 
are positively provable, how can theory explain the conditions 
under which the 3 billion or so in the informal sector of LMIC 
would seek voluntary health insurance?”12
Classical theories of demand for HI posit the hypothesis 
that the decision to purchase HI is individual and based on 
the expected payoffs relative to individual risk perception.13,14 
Dror and Firth12 developed an alternative theory of demand, 
stating that in the environment of poverty and informality 
in LMICs, group consensus influences personal decisions 
to join and pay and that groups reach consensus when they 
are comfortable that the local governance of the scheme will 
uphold the priorities that each group sets for its plan. This 
approach reflects a departure from the classical top-down 
delivery model of HI, in which the promoters (often the 
government) decide both the package design and governance 
issues. This study sets out to provide the proof that the effect 
of group consensus on demand for voluntary enrollment of 
households in health insurance is determinant.
Since the late 1990s, there has been a gradual increase in 
piloting of a bottom-up approach to extending health insur-
ance under the name micro health insurance (MHI).15–17 One 
form of MHI is mutual aid of a local community, which also 
owns and operates the plan on a not-for-profit basis, often 
called Community-based Health Insurance (CBHI). In this 
study, we examine the null hypothesis that individuals decide 
independently to join CBHI. If that hypothesis is rejected, we 
aim to determine the influence of consensus on the decision 
of individuals belonging to the same community to enroll in 
CBHI (“the social effect”). If we can prove the existence of 
a social effect, we will aim to identify the factors that affect 
the formation of a consensus on enrollment into the CBHI 
by the members of the group.
The study of the effect of consensus on demand for 
voluntary MHI uses data from rural India. However, the 
relevance of this study extends much beyond India, con-
sidering that several other developing countries, notably 
Burkina Faso, China, Ethiopia, Ghana, Philippines, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Tanzania, and Vietnam, have implemented CBHI 
schemes.18 We reviewed the literature on CBHI schemes, 
with the view to exploring that the research question we pose 
in this article is not yet resolved. Early reviews confirmed, 
albeit with substantial variation across schemes, that CBHI 
schemes were able to mobilize resources to finance health 
care.19,20 Ekman21 confirmed that such schemes could reach 
low-income groups, although rarely the poorest. Acharya 
et al22 confirmed that some of these schemes had provided 
significant protection from high OOPS, though the impact 
on the poor was limited. Beiseitov et al23 confirmed that 
social networks and “word-of-mouth” played a more deci-
sive role than formal sources of information, and Chat-
terjee et al24 confirmed in particular that word-of-mouth 
dissemination of information resulted in higher scheme 
utilization. Several publications provided evidence that 
solidarity, trust, community networks, civil–society links, 
and state–society links at the local level (all of which are 
components of social capital) positively affected the uptake 
of CBHI25 and that the willingness of farmers to join CBHI 
in China was significantly and positively associated with 
community-level and individual-level social capital.26 Trust 
and peer effects emerged as the key determinants of demand 
in a review of 41 articles published between 2000 and early 
2013,27 as well as in the analysis of the uptake of index-
based drought insurance among coffee farmers in eastern 
Kenya.28 In Senegal, information received from family and 
friends was trusted and positively associated with uptake 
in a scheme.29 A systematic review of 54 studies concluded 
that the uptake of CBHI in LMICs depends on the socio-
economic characteristics of the household (income, educa-
tion, and age of head), recent episodes of chronic illness in 
the family, knowledge, and understanding of insurance and 
the scheme, access to and quality of the health facilities, 
and trust in the scheme management.18 Finally, another 
study about the uptake of the New Cooperative Medical 
Scheme in rural China pointed to the significant role of 
social learning.30 While several previous studies mentioned 
the important role of peers in affecting the demand for 
CBHI in the informal sector, none of the previous studies 
has addressed the theoretical framing of the influence of 
peers on decisions to join CBHI. We aim to provide such 
theoretical analysis in this study.
Data, ethical clearance, locations, 
and methods
Data
The following four sources provided the data for this analysis:
 
R
is
k 
M
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 H
ea
lth
ca
re
 P
ol
icy
 d
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 h
ttp
s:
//w
ww
.d
ov
ep
re
ss
.c
om
/ b
y 
14
5.
5.
87
.2
36
 o
n 
04
-J
an
-2
01
9
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
                               1 / 1
Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 2018:11 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
141
consensus-driven demand for MHi
(1) Household survey: A total of 3,685 households (21,373 
individuals) were surveyed in March–May 2010 as a part of 
the cluster randomized controlled trial (CRCT) study design,31 
where at least one female member of the household was a 
member of a self-help group (SHG) affiliated to selected 
partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The survey 
questionnaire covered issues related to the socio-demographic 
and economic profile of the household, self-reported incidence 
of acute and chronic illness, hospitalization events, the cost 
of health events, and sources of financing it. A year later, in 
2011, 1,335 households (from these 3,685) were offered to 
join CBHI by paying a premium, of which 525 joined. In 2012, 
these 1,335 households, during a repeat survey, were asked to 
confirm their reasons for joining/not joining.
The study population was characterized by low educa-
tion (44%–48% of the household heads of the combined 
sample were illiterate) and low economic background (aver-
age monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) was around 
purchasing power parity $ (PPP$) 75) (Tables S1 and S2). 
Nearest inpatient facility was located around 0.5–2 hours 
away, and the nearest outpatient facility was located around 
20–40 minutes away. The study locations were around 75 km 
away from the nearest urban areas.32
(2) Management information system (MIS):  Information 
on actual enrollment was collected from the MIS system 
maintained for the CBHI schemes under this study.
(3) Census, 2011: Village-level socio-demographic and 
infrastructural indicators were collected from the Village 
Directory of Census of India, 2011.33
(4) Qualitative data: Qualitative data were obtained from 
35 focus group discussions (FGDs) (10 in Pratapgarh, 12 in 
Kanpur Dehat, and 13 in Vaishali) conducted with both the 
enrolled and non-enrolled members of the SHGs during July–
August 2011, after the enrollment process was completed. 
The qualitative surveys were deductive. The objective of 
conducting FGDs was to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the key factors that motivated the households to join/not to 
join the CBHI. The FGDs were moderated by a team of two 
highly qualified (at least post-graduate) researchers trained 
in qualitative methods and techniques, who were proficient 
in the local language (Hindi). The qualitative data were audio 
recorded, along with notes taken by the researchers. The 
data were then first transcribed (verbatim) in Hindi by local 
researchers and then cleaned and translated into English by 
the qualitative researchers. The qualitative data were then 
coded as per thematic responses (such as household decision, 
group decision, trust, and so on) and analyzed theme-wise.
The FGD participants were all females whose average age 
was ~40 years (Table S2). Average years of formal  education 
of the participants were ~3–4 years with the majority being 
illiterate (50%–70%). Approximately 60%–70% of the 
respondents were engaged in domestic duties.
ethical clearance
This project obtained ethical clearance first from the ethics 
committee of the University of Cologne, Germany (knowl-
edge partner in the project) in February 2010. A follow-up 
approval of changes introduced to the questionnaires after 
the baseline study was issued by the same committee in 
February 2012. A third approval was issued by the ethics 
committee of the Micro Insurance Academy (New Delhi) in 
August 2015 to confirm that the survey tools, data collec-
tion, and analysis methodologies complied with the ethical 
requirements as practiced in India, in addition to the clearance 
already obtained earlier.33
study locations
The data relate to three CBHI schemes implemented in rural 
Pratapgarh and Kanpur Dehat districts of Uttar Pradesh state 
and in Vaishali district of Bihar state, India. The schemes 
were implemented through three grassroots NGOs, with 
technical assistance and facilitation from the Micro Insurance 
Academy, New Delhi.
Methods
Quantitative methods
Ceteris paribus, when the household decides to join CBHI 
independently of its reference group, the choice is expected to 
be dependent on the socio-economic characteristics, financial 
profile, access to health facilities, and recent health events of 
that household34 (see Table S1 for details of the variables). 
The model can be presented as:
CBHI
h
 = a SES
h
 + bFIRP
h
 + g SS
h
 + d HE
h
 + e
h 
 (1)
Where CBHI
h
 is a binary variable with a value of 1 if 
household h has joined CBHI, else 0.
SES
h
 consists of the socio-economic characteristics of 
the household that include caste, MPCE quintile in which 
the household is, age, gender, educational attainment, and 
employment status of the household head.
The financial profile of the household is represented by 
the vector FIRP
h
 (formal insurance and informal risk pooling 
mechanism), consisting of subscription status to Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY, government hospital insur-
ance) household type (joint or nuclear), household size, 
whether the household shares the income of the earning 
members for day-to-day activities, and sources of borrowing 
for non-health purpose in recent past.
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The supply side of health characteristics is captured by 
the vector SS
h
 (travel time to the nearest inpatient and out-
patient facility).
HE
h
 represents the health profile of the household (num-
ber of long-term, short-term illnesses and hospitalization 
events).
e
h
 is the error term that captures the unobservable char-
acteristics, which may affect CBHI
h
.
To address the first research question, the predicted prob-
ability of each household (CBHI
h
) is estimated using equa-
tion 1. In the next step, the expected proportion of members 
joining CBHI from each SHG is estimated using CBHI
h
 and 
then compared with the actual proportion of members that 
joined from each SHG, followed by a binomial testing of the 
difference to assess the significance of difference.
Method to determine consensus on enrollment 
decision
To answer the second research question on the role of consen-
sus in enrollment decision, we define consensus as a “general 
agreement/resolution arrived at by most of those concerned, 
after everyone’s opinions are heard and understood, and a solu-
tion that everyone agrees to is reached” by following the studies 
by Sultana and Thompson35 and Mohammed and Ringseis.36
To measure consensus, we first estimated the coefficient 
of unalikeability (CUA), which measures the variability of 
the binary outcome (yes or no) – in our context the decision 
to join CBHI within a group of households affiliated with 
an SHG. In other words, CUA measures how often the deci-
sions of households differ from one another.37 The CUA can 
be explained as:
CUA
C x x
n n
x x
x x
x xi j
i j
i j
i j
i j
=
( )
−
≠
=



=
≠∑ , , ,
,
( , )
2
1
0
where C  
 
(2)
Here, x
i
 and x
j
 are the possible outcomes (decision to join 
or not join), and C(x
i
, x
j
) is the number of events where the 
decision is different. The denominator, n2–n, represents the 
total number of possible combinations of outcomes.38
Next, we estimated the coefficient of consensus (CC) 
using the following formula:
CC = 1 – CUA (3)
A value of 1 means that all group members made an 
identical choice; a value of zero means that no two members 
held the same position. The higher the value, the stronger is 
the group consensus.
We calculated CC for the enrollment decision to join 
CBHI at the group level using equation 3. The explanatory 
variables mentioned in equation 1 were recalculated at the 
group level (see Table S2 for the details of the variables). 
In addition to that, we also included several village-level 
characteristics as explanatory variables. Hence, the model 
specification changes to:
CC
g
 = a SES
g
+ bFIRP
g
 + g SS
g
 + aHE
g
 + μSHG
g
 + nVILL
v
 + e
g
 (4)
Here, CC
g
 is a continuous variable representing the 
level of consensus for SHG g on the decision to join CBHI 
(CC-CBHI).
The explanatory variables are grouped under six cat-
egories: (i) socio-economic characteristics of the household 
(SES), (ii) variables reflecting access to formal insurance 
and informal risk pooling mechanism within the household 
(FIRP), (iii) variables related to access to health facilities 
(SS), (iv) variables reflecting perception about the health 
status of the household members (HE), (v) variables reflect-
ing the level of consensus with an SHG on the decision 
to join CBHI and other SHG level characteristics such 
as average education level within the group, proportion 
of working members, proportion of members engaged in 
domestic duties etc. (SHG) and finally, (vi) variables rep-
resenting the characteristics of the village the household 
belongs to (VILL).
The vector also includes a variable to indicate the group’s 
(above average) empowerment score; this score represents 
the average level of empowerment of the members of each 
SHG in taking vital decisions in their household, calculated 
based on the average score of answers to five questions 
that the respondents were asked about their role in day-to-
day household operations. The questions were whether the 
woman SHG member of the household decides 1) what food 
to buy, 2) what major goods to buy, 3) how much schooling 
to give children, 4) what to do when a child is sick, and 5) 
whether she needs permission from her husband/in-laws/
other adults in the household to visit the local market. If the 
answer was “yes, the SHG member takes the decision (or 
does not need permission to go to local market)”, a score of 
1 was assigned to each response, else 0. The average score 
for each household was used at the group level to calculate 
the average empowerment score for the group (summation 
of empowerment score of the households in that SHG/total 
number of group members). A dummy variable was created 
to indicate if the group has an above average score of all the 
SHGs in that locality.
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VILL
v
 includes the village-level indicators (number of 
secondary schools and family welfare centers, whether there 
is mobile and newspaper coverage in the village).
An ordinary least square (OLS) regression was applied 
to estimate the determinants of CC
g
.
In the following step, we used only the variables that 
were significant, after having checked the R-square value 
(that represents the goodness of fit, which is how close the 
actual observations are to that of the estimated observation).
We modify equation 4 in the next step by adding other 
variables that represent the degree of consensus among the 
group members on why they decided to join/not to join 
CBHI, the households’ perceptions of the health facilities 
they normally visit for inpatient services, outpatient services, 
and to buy medicines (see Table S2 for details). The model 
specification changes to:
CC
g
 = a SS
g
+ bSHG
g
 + gVILL
g
 + aCC-RSN
g
 + mCC-HSS
g
 + e
g
 (5)
In equation 5, we add the CC (vector CC-RSN) for each 
group to express the reasons the households specified to 
explain their decision to join or not join CBHI (responses 
related to the price of insurance, the decision of household 
head, trust that the NGOs will implement as promised, trust 
that group members can operate the scheme, insurance 
understanding, and health events in households).
In addition, in this model we used as explanatory vari-
able the households’ consensus on existing health services, 
represented by the vector CC-HSS, which captures the CC 
of the households’ opinion (reason to choose that facility, 
perception on services provided by the staff, availability 
of medical supplies, and overall satisfaction) on the health 
facility they normally visit (inpatient, outpatient, and 
pharmacy).
We added the consensus vectors in a phased manner to 
capture the changes in R-square value and assess the impor-
tance of each vector on the group consensus on joining CBHI 
using an OLS framework.
Qualitative methods
Once the enrollment process was over in 2011, the 141 
SHGs that were offered to join CBHI were sub-divided into 
the following two broad categories in all three locations: 1) 
enrolled (86 SHGs with at least one member enrolled) and 
2) no-one enrolled (55 SHGs from which no one enrolled). 
For the FGDs, 35 out of the 141 SHGs (25%) were randomly 
selected from each cohort (20 from enrolled and 15 from non-
enrolled). The FGDs were conducted during June–July 2011 
with ~90%–100% (~8–10 members) participation rate from 
each sample group. The discussions focused on the reasons 
that influenced the groups’ and the households’ decision to 
join or not-to-join CBHI. All the FGDs were conducted in 
Hindi (the local language), qualitative data were then tran-
scribed into English and fitted into the software package 
Atlas-Ti for coding and analysis.
Results
Quantitative results
social effect
The results from the regression analysis of equation 1 are 
given in Table 1. The households classified as scheduled 
caste or scheduled tribe (SC/ST) were more likely to enroll 
in CBHI in Pratapgarh. Poorest-quintile households had a 
lower probability of enrolling than the middle expenditure-
quintile households in Pratapgarh and Kanpur Dehat, and 
in Pratapgarh, the rich-quintiles had a higher probability of 
joining insurance compared to the middle quintile. House-
holds in which family members share their income to meet 
daily expenses were less likely to enroll in Pratapgarh and 
Kanpur Dehat. Presence of children in the family positively 
influenced uptake in Pratapgarh and Vaishali, and the pres-
ence of adults had a negative association in Kanpur Dehat. 
Formal education of the household head increased the likeli-
hood of enrolling in Vaishali.
Table 2 contains the predicted proportion of group 
members who would join CBHI, estimated using only the 
characteristics of household h using equation 1 under the 
hypothesis that each household decides independently. 
The result was different from the observed proportion of 
members who had joined CBHI for all the groups in the 
study locations. For 73 groups, the actual proportion was 
less than the predicted proportion (the lowest difference 
was –0.46), whereas in the other 68 groups the actual pro-
portion was higher than predicted (the highest difference 
was 0.69). The difference between the observed and the 
predicted proportions of joining CBHI was significant for 
86 out of 141 groups (61%). The high number of groups for 
which the difference between the predicted and observed 
proportion was significant indicates that the decision of 
households to join CBHI is not explainable solely by the 
household indicators, which leads to the conclusion that 
the null hypothesis (that the probabilities of household 
participation in CBHI are independent of each other) does 
not hold for most groups. It also indicates a possible role of 
the group (ie, beyond the household level) and geographic 
influence on the decision-making process. We term this 
influence ‘the social effect’.
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Table 1 logit regression of marginal effect estimates (standard errors) at the household level with household-level characteristics
Indicators Pratapgarh Kanpur Dehat Vaishali
Household socio-economic status
caste
scheduled caste/scheduled tribe 0.111* –0.0256 0.0769
(0.0575) (0.0543) (0.0508)
Economic status (quintile 3 middle as base)
Poorest by MPce (quintile 1) –0.158** –0.153** 0.0871
(0.0713) (0.0622) (0.0729)
Poor by MPce (quintile 2) –0.0275 0.0433 0.0295
(0.0760) (0.0770) (0.0739)
Rich by MPce (quintile 4) –0.129* 0.0688 0.106
(0.0718) (0.0787) (0.0729)
Richest by MPce (quintile 5) –0.117 –0.0523 0.0587
(0.0746) (0.0709) (0.0820)
Formal insurance and risk pooling
Joint family –0.0228 –0.00474 0.0562
(0.0612) (0.0588) (0.0625)
shares income of all members –0.237*** –0.169** –0.0690
(0.0793) (0.0781) (0.0510)
Household size 0.00527 0.000805 –0.00221
(0.0130) (0.0152) (0.0156)
HH borrowed money from sHg (non-health) –0.0413 0.103 0.0982
(0.0653) (0.0684) (0.0950)
HH borrowed money from friends (non-health) –0.0579 0.0555 0.104
(0.0588) (0.0649) (0.0780)
Household enrolled in RsBY 0.0170 0.0400 0.00304
(0.0655) (0.0718) (0.0487)
Supply-side indicators
average travel time for inpatient service 0.000800 2.06e–05 0.00162
(0.000752) (0.000288) (0.00108)
average travel time for outpatient service 0.000570 0.000760 –0.00120
(0.00228) (0.000752) (0.00143)
Household’s health events
number of long-term illness events 0.0198 0.0210 0.0176
(0.0267) (0.0291) (0.0285)
number of short-term illness events 0.0213 –0.0170 0.0212
(0.0256) (0.0234) (0.0240)
number of hospitalization cases –0.0306 0.0709 –0.0410
(0.0640) (0.0482) (0.0555)
The age profile of households
Presence of children <12 years 0.119* –0.0736 0.195***
(0.0638) (0.0690) (0.0699)
Presence of adult >65 years –0.0699 –0.106* –0.0300
(0.0679) (0.0612) (0.0692)
Household head characteristics
age 0.00209 5.67e–05 –0.000237
(0.00251) (0.00235) (0.00232)
Male –0.0351 –0.0884 –0.0498
(0.0842) (0.113) (0.0739)
Employment
self-employed in agriculture 0.0668 0.0444 –0.0532
(0.0862) (0.0895) (0.0796)
self-employed in non-agriculture 0.0354 0.0187 –0.181**
(0.100) (0.142) (0.0782)
Other work (mainly casual wage work) 0.0829 0.0620 –0.104
(0.0817) (0.121) (0.0748)
(Continued)
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consensus-driven demand for MHi
Table 1 (Continued)
Indicators Pratapgarh Kanpur Dehat Vaishali
Education level
Primary 0.0982 0.0705 0.119*
(0.0828) (0.0895) (0.0691)
Middle 0.0855 –0.0638 0.0391
(0.0853) (0.0721) (0.0727)
secondary and above 0.0889 –0.00478 0.0201
(0.0804) (0.0637) (0.0664)
Observations 433 378 524
Pseudo R-square 0.0645 0.0731 0.0487
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.1.
Abbreviations: HH, household; MPce, monthly per capita expenditure; RsBY, Rashtriya swasthya Bima Yojna government hospital insurance; sHg, self-Help group.
When asked about the reasons for joining/not joining 
CBHI, 16% of the households said that the price of the insur-
ance was affordable, 23% said that it was too expensive, and 
the remaining 61% were indifferent to price. Most respon-
dents reported that their household head’s decision to join 
CBHI, their trust in the NGO, and the group members’ ability 
to administer the schemes were not deciding factors to enroll 
in CBHI. However, their self-assessed understanding of the 
effects of being insured was quite varied: 21% mentioned that 
insurance could protect them when health needs arise, 29% 
reported that they did not understand the benefits of health 
insurance, and the remaining 50% were indifferent to insur-
ance understanding. This result indicates that consensus on 
various issues related to the reasons for joining/not joining 
varied across the target population.
consensus on enrollment decision
Table 3 contains the results of the OLS regression with the 
consensus of joining CBHI (CC-CBHI) at the group level. We 
explored both types of consensus: toward joining and toward 
not joining. There was a negative association in the pooled 
sample between the average travel time to the nearest hospital 
and CC-CBHI, ie, the longer the average travel time, the 
lower the degree of consensus on joining/not joining CBHI. 
In two locations, the CBHI reimbursed hospital fees and 
transportation costs for inpatient care, and all three schemes 
covered wage loss (up to a cap) in cases of hospitalization. 
Considering the low level of hospitalization benefits covered 
by the CBHI schemes, possibly the group members could 
not agree on joining. CC-CBHI was inversely linked to the 
proportion of working members in Kanpur Dehat. Hence, 
the larger the number of members working as self-employed/
casual labor/salaried, the lower the consensus on joining the 
CBHI. This could suggest that as contacts between group 
members weaken, they may be less likely to participate in 
group deliberations and thus obviously less likely to share the 
same reasoning. Also, access to newspapers was negatively 
associated with CC-CBHI for the pooled data. On the flip 
side, in Vaishali and the combined sample, the presence of 
family welfare centers (these are places where village females 
meet regularly to discuss various family planning issues) 
was positively correlated with consensus on joining CBHI.
When CC-CBHI was regressed using only the significant 
variables in the previous step (estimation of equation 4), the 
trends of a negative association with access to inpatient care, 
proportion of working members in the SHG with access to 
a newspaper in the village and positive link with the fam-
ily welfare centers, remained largely unchanged (Table 4, 
columns 1, 4, 7, and 10).
In the next step, we included the consensus relating to 
the reasons of households for joining/not joining CBHI 
(refer to columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 of Table 4). Consensus on 
the price of health insurance was positively correlated with 
the consensus of joining CBHI in Kanpur Dehat, Vaishali, 
and the whole sample. With a one-unit change in the con-
sensus coefficient on price, CC-CBHI increased by 25% 
(P=0.051) in Kanpur Dehat, 53% in Vaishali (P=0.006), 
and 28% (P=0.002) for the combined data. Similarly, the 
consensus for the existing health events at household as a 
reason for joining/not joining CBHI was positively associ-
ated with CC-CBHI in all three locations. A one-unit change 
in the consensus coefficient on the member households’ 
vulnerability toward health events increased CC-CBHI 
by 44% in Pratapgarh (P=0.009), 59% in Kanpur Dehat 
(P=0.022), 43% in Vaishali (P=0.052), and 34% for all 
locations together (P=0.001).
In the next step, we included in the model as explana-
tory variables the consensus indicators of the households’ 
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perspective on the existing health services (the reason to 
choose the facility [cheapest/closest/best/other], opinion 
about the quality of treatment by the medical staff [very 
well/other], availability of medical supplies [always/
usually/other], and overall satisfaction level with inpa-
tient care, outpatient care, and pharmacy [very satisfied/
satisfied/other] [columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 of Table 4]). The 
consensus indicators relating to the price of insurance and 
health events remained largely unchanged. Consensus on 
joining CBHI was positively associated with consensus on 
the reasons to choose the hospital (cheapest/closest/best/
other) in Pratapgarh (coefficient =0.414, P=0.044) and 
overall (coefficient =0.159, P=0.096). Also, consensus on 
respondents’ satisfaction with the treatment provided by 
the medical staff at the inpatient facility (very well/well/
other) was positively associated with CC-CBHI in Vaishali 
(coefficient =0.696, P=0.032).
Overall, the availability of medical supplies at the outpa-
tient facility had a positive influence on consensus, but the 
availability of a pharmacy had a negative influence in Kanpur 
Dehat and the full sample.
Additionally, the inclusion of consensus variables sub-
stantially improved the adjusted R-square values, which 
indicate the percentage of variation explained only by the 
independent variables that affect the dependent variable of 
the regression models (adjusted R-square improved from 
0.016–0.211 to 0.194–0.386, Table 4).
Qualitative results
Findings from the enrolled groups
When participants of the FGDs from the enrolled groups 
were asked about the reason for their decision to enroll in 
CBHI, the highest score was given to “group decision” in 
Pratapgarh (34%) and Vaishali (31%) (Table 5); in Kanpur 
Dehat it was also an important reason (25%), second only 
to affordability and coverage of outpatient services by local 
practitioners (both at 29%).
Initially, many respondents said that they could not under-
stand the benefits and how the scheme operated. However, it 
seems that they were doubters or “fence-sitters” rather than 
opponents because once the group head decided to join, 
other members followed. One respondent in Pratapgarh said 
that: “I used to sit in the meetings, but I was unable to say 
anything. I could not form an opinion at the time as I could 
not understand it. I thought to myself when all the group 
members would join this scheme, I will also join it.” An SHG 
leader from Vaishali reported that: “when I decided to join, 
two other members followed immediately, and a bit later-on, 
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Table 3 OLS regression with coefficient of consensus of joining CBHI within a group as dependent variable
Indicators Pratapgarh Kanpur 
Dehat
Vaishali All locations
Socio-economic profile of member households
Proportion of sc/sT households in sHg 0.0143 0.190 –0.268 0.0343
(0.159) (0.186) (0.212) (0.0674)
average monthly per capita consumption expenditure (non-health, PPP$) 0.00189 –0.000170 0.000491 0.000682
(0.00287) (0.00226) (0.00313) (0.00102)
Financial profile of member households
Proportion of joint families in sHg 0.192 0.162 –0.460 0.0368
(0.348) (0.299) (0.430) (0.147)
Proportion of HHs in sHg that pools income of all members for daily expenses 0.251 0.172 0.338 0.148
(0.298) (0.309) (0.257) (0.115)
average household size 0.0310 –0.0837 –0.0369 0.0309
(0.0587) (0.0675) (0.0956) (0.0275)
Proportion of HHs that have borrowed for non-health events from sHg –0.0404 –0.104 –0.379 –0.128
(0.247) (0.429) (0.459) (0.125)
Proportion of HHs that have borrowed for non-health events from friends 0.357 –0.0408 –0.0588 –0.000390
(0.277) (0.325) (0.481) (0.134)
Proportion of HHs that have borrowed for non-health events from money lenders 0.417 0.0165 0.0390 –0.0902
(0.423) (0.334) (0.230) (0.125)
Proportion of HHs with RsBY coverage –0.185 –0.356 0.181 –0.0741
(0.337) (0.308) (0.264) (0.104)
Access to health facilities
average travel time to nearest iP facility (in minutes) –0.000804 –0.00160 –8.11e–05 –0.00140*
(0.00315) (0.00135) (0.00480) (0.000833)
average travel time to nearest OP facility (in minutes) –0.00808 –0.00146 –0.00371 –0.00199
(0.00973) (0.00417) (0.00800) (0.00256)
Health profile of member households
average number of chronic illnesses in sHg –0.00576 –0.00667 0.0672 0.00920
(0.137) (0.159) (0.151) (0.0565)
average number of acute illnesses in sHg –0.0704 0.0469 –0.0547 0.00566
(0.0945) (0.0903) (0.138) (0.0464)
average number of hospitalization events in sHg –0.103 –0.0806 –0.125 –0.113
(0.280) (0.268) (0.410) (0.128)
Demographic profile of member households
Proportion of HHs with children <12 years of age –0.372 –0.301 0.394 –0.242
(0.370) (0.478) (0.615) (0.175)
Proportion of HHs with adults >65 years of age –0.0108 0.625 –0.0410 0.137
(0.295) (0.377) (0.442) (0.145)
Socio-demographic characteristics of the SHG
average age of the group members –0.00129 –0.0426 –0.164 –0.0374
(0.00930) (0.0932) (0.123) (0.0415)
sHgs with above average education level (D) 0.0287 0.0524 0.0378 –0.00292
(0.112) (0.134) (0.213) (0.0588)
sHgs with above average proportion of members working (D) 0.0218 –0.0291* –0.000796 –0.000745
(0.121) (0.0145) (0.0188) (0.00504)
sHgs with above average proportion of members engaged in domestic work (D) –0.0510 0.201 0.0637 0.0415
(0.137) (0.127) (0.218) (0.0617)
sHgs with above average empowerment score 0.0731 0.0180 0.164 0.0303
(0.0881) (0.113) (0.126) (0.0432)
Village characteristics
number of secondary schools in village 0.176 0.0769 0.0498 0.0630
(0.199) (0.0946) (0.0984) (0.0446)
number of family welfare centers in village 0 0.287 0.506** 0.355***
(0) (0.263) (0.216) (0.108)
Village has mobile phone coverage –0.0150 0.124 –0.0166 0.0612
(0.215) (0.101) (0.140) (0.0460)
(Continued)
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everybody joined.” The early-joiner members played a vital 
role in convincing others to enroll by explaining the benefits 
payable by the CBHI scheme. One participant stated that 
“there were two or three members of our group who were 
not willing to join. So, we explained everything to them. 
Finally, they also joined.”
While further probing the discussions that preceded the 
decision to join CBHI, it was revealed that the participants 
thought that being part of the group was worthwhile and 
might lead to added benefits (more likely to get loans). In 
Kanpur Dehat, one female participant said that: “these groups 
are like support. We can withdraw our money or take a loan 
from the group. That is why we have taken everyone’s opinion 
and then decided to join.”
Participants also emphasized that one of the deciding 
factors in favor of enrollment was their trust in the scheme 
management. In Vaishali, one lady said that: “my husband 
told me that the villagers would do everything, outsiders 
will not decide anything. When the villagers are in charge 
of the decisions, go ahead and enroll in it.” Trust in the 
administrative structure, which included the villagers and the 
implementing NGOs, was the second highest cited factor for 
uptake in Pratapgarh (25%) (Table 5).
Findings from the non-enrolled groups
Inability to pay the premium was cited most frequently by 
SHGs as the reason for not enrolling: 37%–38% of replies 
in the three locations (Table 5). One participant in Kanpur 
Dehat stated that: “We have financial problems, as we must 
feed eight-nine people at home. How can we also pay for the 
insurance?” The timing of the enrollment (March–April), 
which coincided with the season when farmers had to invest 
in farming, was also mentioned by many as a reason. One 
SHG member in Vaishali pointed that: “a farmer can pay the 
premium only during the harvest season. I have a family of 6, 
so my total premium amounts to about Indian rupees (INR) 
1,000. Should I spend that to buy seeds or to buy insurance?”
The consensus among the groups not to join was noted with 
one group in Pratapgarh, following discussions during which 
the members understood that CBHI, unlike SHGs, would not 
lend money from the premium amounts collected; everyone 
from that SHG decided not to enroll as most preferred savings 
with loans over health insurance. Further probing revealed 
that many of the group members believed that health was a 
personal issue which should be taken care of at the household 
level, without involving the entire group. Not surprisingly, 
when most group members decided not to join the scheme, 
the remaining few that initially wanted to join also opted out.
In Vaishali, one member said that: “Our money will be 
deposited in the bank account of the president of the group. 
This is problematic. We do not trust her.” In this case, some 
members were reluctant to trust the CBHI administrator 
because of previous financial irregularities. In addition to 
lack of trust, some participants also doubted the quality of 
care they could expect from the scheme.
Discussion
This study sets out to provide a theoretical explanation, veri-
fied by evidence, about whether the decision of each member 
to enroll in CBHI can be considered to be taken purely based 
on individual utility considerations or whether it is impacted 
by consensus among peers. The null hypothesis we probed 
Table 3 (Continued)
Pratapgarh Kanpur 
Dehat
Vaishali All locations
Village has newspaper coverage –0.125 –0.0606 –0.234 –0.102*
(0.240) (0.118) (0.168) (0.0552)
Location dummies#
Pratapgarh –0.365***
(0.100)
Vaishali –0.259**
(0.109)
constant 0.603 2.507* 0.740 0.962**
(0.897) (1.379) (1.008) (0.403)
Observations 50 42 49 141
adjusted R-square 0.116 0.073 0.234 0.199
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.1. (D) indicates the dummy variable, with value of 1 if sHgs with above average value, else 0. #Values 
of the locational dummies equals 1 if the sHg is in that district, else 0.
Abbreviations: cBHi, community-based Health insurance; HH, households; iP, inpatient; MPce, monthly per capita expenditure; Ols, ordinary least square; OP, 
outpatient; PPP$, purchasing power parity $; sc, scheduled caste; sHg, self-help groups; sT, scheduled tribe.
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was that households decide whether to join CBHI indepen-
dently from each other.
The findings of the study revealed that the household’s 
decision to join the scheme34 is significantly influenced by 
factors such as the caste of the household, its income (proxy 
MPCE quintile it belongs to), resource-pooling practices 
within the household, and to a lesser extent age distribu-
tion in the household and education status of the household 
head. However, these factors cannot fully explain the prob-
abilities of a household joining the scheme as the predicted 
proportion of SHG members joining, calculated based on 
household characteristics, was significantly different from 
the observed proportion for most groups. This indicated that 
the decision whether or not to join CBHI was influenced by 
factors other than household level characteristics. There-
fore, we reject the null hypothesis. Based on the study by 
Manski,39 we ascribe the household decision to influences 
of the group and to local characteristics, which we term as 
the “social effect”.
Dror and Firth12 identified several theoretical inadequa-
cies to the explanations of demand for health insurance 
based on individual exogenous variables (such as age, 
gender, education, occupation, and other socioeconomic 
characteristics) when these are applied to the informal sec-
tor. They contended that the expected utility theory does 
not take account of the effect of information asymmetry. 
Furthermore, they argued in their seminal paper that the 
demand for insurance in the informal sector is a collective 
decision of informal groups to which people belong. Indeed, 
it is not very difficult to see that for an intricate product as 
insurance, most people would tend to seek an opinion from 
their peers either when they have no information (when 
insurance is not sold at all) or to lend more credibility to 
information when obtained from peers than when dissemi-
nated by commissioned insurance agents (in the rare cases 
that agents come to villages to sell health insurance). This 
is all the more relevant in the case of CBHI, where the com-
munity plays a major role in designing the benefits package 
and in governing the scheme. Peer influence on information 
dissemination and demand generation has been studied by 
several other authors,24,39–41 who concluded that peer effects 
(including information sharing within peer groups) posi-
tively and significantly influence program participation and 
scheme utilization. These analyses support the assertion of 
Dror and Firth.12 Furthermore, Dror et al42 have shown that 
voluntary and contributory CBHI for members of SHGs 
relied on an engaging experience of the members with peers 
to validate perceived priorities of the target group and that, 
moreover, the strongest motive for choice (more than price 
or package-composition) was the wish to join a consensus 
and the intention that many members should benefit. As they 
also showed that the degree of consensus improved with 
iterative discussions among the members, we now seek to 
explain what issues influence the level of consensus within 
a group on joining an insurance scheme.
To that effect, we built a model to explain other influ-
ences on individual decision-making when the process is 
undertaken by groups rather than by individuals in isolation 
from peers. We examined variables that remain constant at 
the group level, such as access to health care facilities, the 
average socio-demographic profile of the groups, and other 
village-level characteristics (Table 3). That model identified 
Table 5 Reason to enroll/not-enroll in cBHi – percentage distribution of responses by broad categories during FgDs
Categories Pratapgarh Kanpur Dehat Vaishali
Enrolled
group decision 34.4 25.0 30.7
Trust factor/ngO suggested 25.0 10.7 12.0
ability to pay 15.6 28.6 17.3
Benefit package understanding 0.0 0.0 5.3
Financial protection 18.8 7.1 20.0
Benefit of local doctors and medicine (low cost high frequency) 6.3 28.6 14.7
Non-enrolled
ability to pay 38.1 36.8 37.5
Financial liquidity 0.0 0.0 6.3
group decision 38.1 21.1 25.0
Trust factor 4.8 0.0 16.7
Household decision 9.5 10.5 6.3
Quality of care 9.5 31.6 8.3
Abbreviations: cBHi, community-based Health insurance; FgDs, focus group discussions; ngO, non-governmental organization.
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only one factor that strengthens the propensity to join – 
 better access to health care facilities – but when its adjusted 
R-square values are considered, this factor did not infer a 
major improvement.
We then examined qualitative variables capturing 
opinions and views of the respondents on various aspects 
of the insurance scheme. As explained in the “Methods” 
section, we constructed a consensus coefficient (a tweak 
of the CUA)37,38 in which 1 signifies full consensus and 0 
no consensus at all (full variance). We added the consensus 
coefficient as an independent variable of the linear regression 
model estimating the proportion of members who joined the 
schemes so that we could assess the effect of the percep-
tion about pricing, trust in the institutions, the likelihood 
of adverse health events occurring in the household, and so 
on. We now observed a substantial increase in the adjusted 
R-square values of the model (Table 4), indicating improved 
goodness-of-fit in each of the three locations separately and 
in the data for all three schemes combined. The findings 
included the following:
1. Consensus on “perceptions about the pricing” of the 
product emerged significant in two of the three locations 
separately and in combined data for the three locations 
(CC-CBHI increases by 25% in Kanpur Dehat [P=0.051], 
53% in Vaishali [P=0.006], and 28% overall [P=0.002] for 
one-unit change in consensus on the price of insurance).
2. Consensus on the “likelihood that the household would 
experience adverse health events” was significant in all 
three locations separately and in the combined dataset 
(increase in CC-CBHI is 44% [P=0.009], 59% [P=0.022], 
43% [P=0.052], and 34% [P=0.001] for Pratapgarh, Kan-
pur Dehat, Vaishali, and pooled sample, respectively).
3. Consensus on the “parameters for choosing an inpatient 
health care facility” emerged significantly in one location 
(increase in CC-CBHI is 41%, P=0.044) and also in the 
three locations combined (increase in CC-CBHI is 16%, 
P=0.096).
4. Consensus on the “perceptions about the quality of service 
at the nearest inpatient” health care facility emerged sig-
nificantly for one location (increase in CC-CBHI=70%, 
P=0.032).
5. Consensus on the “perceptions about the quality and 
availability of medical supplies” in the “nearest outpa-
tient health care” facility emerged significantly for the 
combined dataset (increase in CC-CBHI=30%, P=0.022).
6. Consensus on the “perceptions about the quality and 
availability of medical supplies received” from the “near-
est pharmacy” was significant for one location (decrease 
in CC-CBHI=45%, P=0.070) and the combined dataset 
(decrease in CC-CBHI=28%, P=0.028).
These results bring to the fore two aspects of the effect 
of consensus on catalyzing demand for health insurance. 
First, the process through which the groups reached con-
sensus reduced information asymmetry by supplementing 
perceptions based only on individual experience with the 
experiences and perceptions of other trusted peers. The 
focus was to reach a collective decision, based on the col-
lective perception of welfare gains to many members of 
the group. Second, the topics that influenced the groups’ 
decisions to join the insurance were mainly qualitative 
about the likelihood to experience certain cost-generating 
health events and about the collective perception of the 
quality of care.
It is self-explanatory why an individual in isolation 
from other people deciding whether or not to join cannot 
be informed about the collective qualitative evaluations of 
exposure to risk or the quality of care she/he might expect 
when seeking care. Nor can a single individual deciding in 
isolation get a sense of the considerations that the entire ref-
erence group shares in defending the interests of the group. 
A solo decision-maker is thus deprived of information on 
the issues that were most instrumental in catalyzing demand 
for insurance. Such information cannot be provided by an 
insurance agent or any other person outside the group, who 
is neither informed about these things nor motivated to seek 
and share such information at the village level.
Limitation
For the quantitative methods, the small sample size that was 
used for the consensus analysis (total of 141), particularly 
at the locational level, limits the generalizability of these 
findings. At the same time, one of the team members who 
facilitated the FGDs was from the implementing NGOs and 
thus very familiar with the participants. This familiarity with 
the group was an advantage as it sets the participants at ease 
to share their experiences. We recognize that the familiarity 
could also have been a barrier to get the non-enrolled par-
ticipants to participate fully.
Conclusion
The redeeming message of these insights is that persons in 
the informal sector, in settings of poverty and informality, 
would seek voluntary health insurance when they could par-
ticipate with their peers in formulating collective perceptions 
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of (qualitative) welfare gains. These collective perceptions 
are context-dependent and cannot be divorced from the 
 specific conditions applying in each location, such as the 
local evaluation of service quality of health care provid-
ers. These conditions are fundamentally different from an 
individual measure of utility gains. The postulate proposed 
by Dror and Firth12 is thus upheld.
The policy ramifications of this new evidence are that 
success in catalyzing voluntary and contributory demand 
for health insurance in the informal sector is contingent on 
facilitating group dialog within targeted communities, with 
the view to reaching consensus on collective perceptions of 
their exposure to risks, perceptions of the quality of care they 
might expect, the fairness of the price, and more generally 
a collective assessment of the welfare gains that the group 
can expect from being insured.
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Supplementary materials
Table S1 Descriptive statistics of key variables for household level analysis – mean±sD
Indicators Pratapgarh Kanpur Dehat Vaishali
Non-
enrolled
Enrolled Non-
enrolled
Enrolled Non-
enrolled
Enrolled
Household socio-economic status
caste – scheduled caste/scheduled tribe (D) 0.32±0.47 0.41±0.49 0.27±0.45 0.25±0.43 0.38±0.49 0.44±0.50
economic status – poorest by MPce (quintile 1) (D) 0.21±0.41 0.17±0.38 0.23±0.42 0.11±0.31 0.20±0.40 0.26±0.44
economic status – poor by MPce (quintile 2) (D) 0.18±0.38 0.25±0.43 0.19±0.40 0.22±0.42 0.20±0.40 0.18±0.39
economic status – middle by MPce (quintile 3) (D) (base) 0.16±0.37 0.25±0.44 0.20±0.40 0.23±0.42 0.22±0.42 0.18±0.38
economic status – rich by MPce (quintile 4) (D) 0.21±0.41 0.16±0.37 0.17±0.37 0.26±0.44 0.19±0.39 0.21±0.41
economic status – richest by MPce (quintile 5) (D) 0.24±0.43 0.17±0.37 0.20±0.40 0.18±0.39 0.18±0.39 0.17±0.38
Formal insurance and risk pooling
Joint family (D) 0.53±0.50 0.52±0.50 0.46±0.50 0.39±0.49 0.35±0.48 0.40±0.49
shares income of all members (D) 0.91±0.29 0.83±0.37 0.87±0.33 0.78±0.42 0.70±0.46 0.66±0.47
Household size (c) 5.80±2.79 6.28±2.62 6.09±2.35 5.75±1.91 5.38±2.24 5.57±1.92
HH borrowed money from sHg (non-health) (D) 0.19±0.40 0.19±0.39 0.16±0.37 0.24±0.43 0.06±0.24 0.07±0.25
HH borrowed money from friends (non-health) (D) 0.25±0.44 0.24±0.43 0.19±0.39 0.23±0.42 0.08±0.27 0.12±0.32
HH borrowed money from money lenders (non-health) (D) (base) 0.05±0.22 0.09±0.28 0.14±0.35 0.10±0.30 0.29±0.45 0.43±0.50
Household enrolled in RsBY (D) 0.17±0.37 0.20±0.40 0.14±0.35 0.18±0.39 0.49±0.50 0.48±0.50
Supply-side indicators
average travel time for inpatient service (c) 41.7±33.8 47.6±34.2 127. ±84.9 133. ±87.3 28.3±21.4 30.4±22.2
average travel time for outpatient service (c) 18.8±11.2 19.9±12.0 32.7±30.1 37.6±32.9 17.9±15.8 16.7±17.6
Household’s health events
number of long-term illness events (c) 1.40±0.89 1.51±1.16 0.70±0.85 0.76±0.88 0.71±0.82 0.76±0.87
number of short-term illness events (c) 1.12±1.09 1.29±1.15 1.33±1.06 1.32±1.07 1.04±0.94 1.13±1.04
number of hospitalization cases (c) 0.14±0.42 0.14±0.37 0.16±0.48 0.25±0.49 0.18±0.42 0.18±0.44
Age profile of household
Presence of children <12 years (D) 0.74±0.44 0.84±0.36 0.78±0.41 0.69±0.47 0.81±0.39 0.90±0.30
Presence of adult >65 years (D) 0.28±0.45 0.22±0.42 0.21±0.41 0.14±0.35 0.20±0.40 0.19±0.39
Household head characteristics
age (c) 46.3±12.7 45.9±13.1 44.8±12.6 45.0±11.5 42.6±13.0 41.2±12.0
Male (D) 0.73±0.45 0.77±0.42 0.90±0.30 0.87±0.34 0.78±0.41 0.72±0.45
employment – self-employed in agriculture (D) 0.21±0.41 0.21±0.41 0.67±0.47 0.68±0.47 0.18±0.39 0.19±0.39
employment – self-employed in non-agriculture (D) 0.14±0.35 0.14±0.35 0.06±0.24 0.06±0.23 0.21±0.41 0.15±0.36
employment – other work (mainly casual wage) (D) 0.37±0.48 0.43±0.50 0.14±0.35 0.13±0.34 0.42±0.49 0.39±0.49
employment – not working (D) (base) 0.27±0.44 0.22±0.41 0.13±0.34 0.14±0.35 0.19±0.39 0.27±0.44
education level – illiterate (D) 0.37±0.48 0.28±0.45 0.30±0.46 0.28±0.45 0.48±0.50 0.44±0.50
education level – primary (D) 0.16±0.37 0.20±0.40 0.11±0.31 0.14±0.35 0.13±0.34 0.19±0.40
education level – middle (D) 0.18±0.38 0.21±0.41 0.16±0.37 0.12±0.33 0.14±0.35 0.15±0.36
education level – secondary and above (D) 0.29±0.45 0.31±0.46 0.43±0.50 0.46±0.50 0.25±0.43 0.22±0.41
SHG level characteristics
sHg – average empowerment score (c) 0.39±0.49 0.51±0.50 0.57±0.50 0.66±0.48 0.65±0.48 0.74±0.44
sHg – highest years of formal education (c) 0.39±0.49 0.48±0.50 0.58±0.50 0.55±0.50 0.40±0.49 0.49±0.50
sHg – average age (c) 40.8±5.65 40.6±5.92 38.6±3.72 38.8±3.47 36.5±3.98 36.3±4.16
sHg – proportion of working members (c) 0.66±0.47 0.58±0.49 0.45±0.50 0.57±0.50 0.55±0.50 0.38±0.49
sHg – proportion of domestic workers (c) 0.55±0.50 0.53±0.50 0.27±0.45 0.17±0.38 0.36±0.48 0.49±0.50
Village-level indicators
number of secondary schools in village (c) 0.66±0.48 0.73±0.45 0.10±0.54 0.00±0.00 0.53±0.76 0.49±0.61
number of family welfare centers in village (c) 0.00±0.00 0.00±0.00 0.04±0.19 0.00±0.00 0.10±0.30 0.00±0.00
Mobile coverage in village (D) 0.86±0.35 0.94±0.23 0.58±0.49 0.43±0.50 0.35±0.48 0.50±0.50
newspaper coverage in village (D) 0.71±0.45 0.81±0.39 0.26±0.44 0.14±0.35 0.61±0.49 0.66±0.47
sample size 259 174 269 109 282 242
Note: (D) represents dummy (binary) variables, and (c) represents continuous variables.
Abbreviations: HH, household; MPce, monthly per capita expenditure; RsBY, Rashtriya swasthya Bima Yojna government hospital insurance; sHg, self-Help group.
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consensus-driven demand for MHi
Table S2 Descriptive statistics of key variables for sHg-level analysis – mean±sD
Indicators Pratapgarh Kanpur 
Dehat
Vaishali All 
locations
Coefficient of consensus – joining decision at the group level (dependent variable)
Coefficient of consensus – joining decision at group level (dependent variable) 0.70±0.23 0.90±0.19 0.70±0.22 0.76±0.23
Socio-economic profile of member households
Proportion of sc/sT households in sHg 0.33±0.37 0.26±0.24 0.40±0.36 0.33±0.34
average monthly per capita consumption expenditure (non-health, PPP$) 60.5±19.9 94.9±25.3 73.3±22.3 75.2±26.3
Financial profile of member households
Proportion of joint families in sHg 0.53±0.23 0.46±0.20 0.36±0.16 0.45±0.21
Proportion of HHs in sHg that pools income of all members for daily expenses 0.88±0.16 0.84±0.18 0.68±0.20 0.80±0.20
average household size 6.14±1.31 6.05±0.85 5.43±0.72 5.86±1.05
Proportion of HHs that have borrowed for non-health events from sHg 0.19±0.22 0.19±0.14 0.06±0.10 0.15±0.17
Proportion of HHs that have borrowed for non-health events from friends 0.24±0.19 0.20±0.15 0.10±0.10 0.18±0.16
Proportion of HHs that have borrowed for non-health events from money lenders 0.07±0.12 0.13±0.14 0.37±0.21 0.19±0.21
Proportion of HHs with RsBY cards 0.18±0.16 0.16±0.17 0.48±0.25 0.28±0.25
Access to health facilities
average travel time to nearest iP facility (in minutes) 44.1±15.5 132.0±46.4 29.6±11.1 65.4±52.2
average travel time to nearest OP facility (in minutes) 19.1±5.85 35.8±12.8 17.6±7.00 23.6±11.8
Health profile of member households
average number of chronic illnesses in sHg 1.44±0.39 0.70±0.31 0.73±0.41 0.97±0.51
average number of acute illnesses in sHg 1.17±0.55 1.31±0.41 1.08±0.41 1.18±0.47
average number of hospitalization events in sHg 0.13±0.16 0.18±0.18 0.18±0.13 0.16±0.16
Demographic profile of member households
Proportion of HHs with children <12 years of age 0.80±0.14 0.76±0.14 0.84±0.12 0.80±0.14
Proportion of HHs with adults >65 years of age 0.25±0.18 0.19±0.16 0.19±0.12 0.21±0.15
Socio-demographic characteristics of the SHG
average age of the group members 40.6±5.91 38.4±4.20 36.2±4.05 38.5±5.14
sHgs with above average education level (D) 0.44±0.50 0.60±0.50 0.67±0.47 0.57±0.50
sHgs with above average proportion of members working (D) 0.44±0.50 0.55±0.50 0.47±0.50 0.48±0.50
sHgs with above average proportion of members engaged in domestic work (D) 0.60±0.49 0.52±0.51 0.47±0.50 0.53±0.50
sHgs with above average empowerment score 0.50±0.51 0.24±0.43 0.39±0.49 0.38±0.49
Village characteristics
number of secondary schools in village 0.68±0.47 0.07±0.46 0.49±0.68 0.43±0.60
number of family welfare centers in village 0.00±0.00 0.05±0.22 0.06±0.24 0.04±0.19
Village has mobile phone coverage 0.88±0.33 0.52±0.51 0.41±0.50 0.61±0.49
Village has newspaper coverage 0.74±0.44 0.21±0.42 0.63±0.49 0.55±0.50
Coefficient of consensus – reasons for joining/not joining
Price of insurance (low, expensive, indifferent) 0.49±0.19 0.70±0.24 0.54±0.18 0.57±0.22
Head of HH decision (yes, no, indifferent) 0.71±0.22 0.75±0.22 0.80±0.19 0.75±0.21
Trust in ngOs to run cBHi (yes, no, indifferent) 0.84±0.18 0.90±0.15 0.84±0.19 0.86±0.18
Health events in HH (too many, very few, not a factor) 0.79±0.22 0.93±0.13 0.86±0.16 0.86±0.18
insurance understanding (understands insurance, do not understand, not a factor) 0.57±0.21 0.57±0.20 0.52±0.16 0.55±0.19
Trust on us to run cBHi (yes, no, indifferent) 0.60±0.21 0.50±0.18 0.55±0.14 0.55±0.18
Coefficient of consensus – perspective on available IP facility
Reason to choose the facility (cheapest, closest, best, others) 0.37±0.26 0.16±0.13 0.14±0.11 0.23±0.21
Perspective on treatment received (very well, well, others) 0.68±0.21 0.50±0.19 0.49±0.15 0.56±0.20
Perspective on medical supply (always, usually, others) 0.51±0.16 0.43±0.12 0.46±0.11 0.47±0.14
Overall satisfaction (very satisfied, satisfied, others) 0.71±0.22 0.54±0.16 0.55±0.15 0.61±0.19
Coefficient of consensus – perspective on available OP facility
Reason to choose the facility (cheapest, closest, best, others) 0.62±0.25 0.52±0.21 0.42±0.17 0.52±0.23
Perspective on treatment received (very well, well, others) 0.73±0.23 0.50±0.17 0.50±0.15 0.58±0.21
Perspective on medical supply (always, usually, others) 0.52±0.18 0.42±0.11 0.50±0.19 0.48±0.17
Overall satisfaction (very satisfied, satisfied, others) 0.76±0.20 0.58±0.17 0.61±0.18 0.66±0.20
(Continued)
 
R
is
k 
M
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 H
ea
lth
ca
re
 P
ol
icy
 d
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 h
ttp
s:
//w
ww
.d
ov
ep
re
ss
.c
om
/ b
y 
14
5.
5.
87
.2
36
 o
n 
04
-J
an
-2
01
9
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
                               1 / 1
Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 2018:11submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
Risk Management and Healthcare Policy
Publish your work in this journal
Submit your manuscript here: https://www.dovepress.com/risk-management-and-healthcare-policy-journal
Risk Management and Healthcare Policy is an international, peer-reviewed, 
open access journal focusing on all aspects of public health, policy, and 
preventative measures to promote good health and improve morbidity 
and mortality in the population. The journal welcomes submitted papers 
covering original research, basic science, clinical and epidemiological 
studies, reviews and evaluations, guidelines, expert opinion and com-
mentary, case reports and extended reports. The manuscript management 
system is completely online and includes a very quick and fair peer-
review system, which is all easy to use. Visit http://www.dovepress.com/
testimonials.php to read real quotes from published authors.
Dovepress
158
Dror et al
Table S2 (Continued)
Indicators Pratapgarh Kanpur 
Dehat
Vaishali All 
locations
Coefficient of consensus – perspective on available pharmacy
Reason to choose the facility (cheapest, closest, best, others) 0.67±0.25 0.50±0.18 0.46±0.16 0.55±0.22
Perspective on treatment received (very well, well, others) 0.71±0.21 0.55±0.17 0.55±0.15 0.60±0.20
Perspective on medical supply (always, usually, others) 0.50±0.16 0.47±0.14 0.51±0.16 0.49±0.15
Overall satisfaction (very satisfied, satisfied, others) 0.70±0.22 0.63±0.19 0.58±0.13 0.64±0.19
sample size 50 42 49 141
Abbreviations: cBHi, community-based Health insurance; HH, household; iP, inpatient; ngOs, non-governmental organizations; OP, outpatient; PPP$, purchasing power 
parity $; Rashtriya swasthya Bima Yojna (RsBY) government hospital insurance; sc, scheduled caste; sHg, self-Help group; sT, scheduled tribe.
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